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Abstract. In this paper we suggest ways in which logic and law may
usefully relate; and we present an analytic proof system dealing with the
Jones Po¨rn’s deontic logic of Ideality and Subideality, which offers some
suggestions about how to embed legal systems in label formalism.
1 Introduction
Why should Law need automated proof systems? The answer to this question
implies an answer to the following question: Is logic needed in Law? In fact it has
been argued that logics are useless for Law, see, for example, (Kelsen 1989). We
believe that logic, and deontic logics in particular —but also modal logics— have
a role to play in Law; for example if one wants to study what the relationships
are among the various degrees of adjudication in Italian Law, one should note
that they give rise to a transitive, irreflexive and finite structure, which is the
frame of the modal logic of provability GL; one of the most important properties
of such a logic is that no system, (no court), in this frame, could claim its own
correctness without becoming incorrect (Boolos 1993, Smullyan 1988), but the
correctness of a lower court can be established by a higher one. This example
shows that the study of modal logic can help in finding certain already known
properties of legal systems. Moreover, each time we are dealing with the notions
of Obligation and Permission, and we are interested in the study of their mutual
relationship, we can arrange them into a deontic framework, thus producing a
certain kind of deontic logic. Finally a hint for the use of logic in legal reasoning
is given, for example in the Italian case, by the law itself; in fact article 192, 1◦
comma of the “Italian code of criminal procedure” prescribes that the judges
state the reasons of their adjudication; moreover several other articles of the
same code, state: when evidence is valid, how evidence should be used in order
to lead to an adjudication, etc. . . . On this basis the “Italian code of criminal
procedure” can be thought of as a deductive system where its articles act as the
inference rules, whereas the articles of the “Italian code of criminal law” are the
axioms.
What does a proof system do? A proof system can work in two ways. The
first of them consists of producing admissible steps one after the other according
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to the inference rules; in this way each step is guaranteed to be correct, but we
are not led to the goal we want to prove. The other one consists of verifying
whether a conclusion follows from given premises, i.e. if the adjudication follows
logically from the evidence, mainly by refuting the negation of the conclusion.
The system we propose is based on the logic of ideality and subideality devel-
oped by Jones and Po¨rn, and it verifies in the above mentioned logical framework
whether a given conclusion follows from given premises. Moreover, due to its ba-
sic control structure it can also be used as an analytic direct proof system.
2 Ideal and Subideal Deontic Logic
This logic has been developed in (Jones and Po¨rn 1985, Jones and Po¨rn 1986)
in order to have a system which permits both factual and deontic detachment;
moreover it is possible to define several types of obligation, i.e. ideal obligation
and subideal obligation, thus avoiding the drawback that “actual” obligation
collapses in the logical necessity of the framework we are using (deontic neces-
sity).
As pointed out by Kelsen
Jurisprudence, by describing the validity of a law system, does not assert
what happens regularly, but what ought happen according to a given law
system (Kelsen 1989, 458).
Jones and Po¨rn’s (1985, 1986) deontic logic DL has been devised for dealing with
ideal as well as sub-ideal situations, i.e. situations which admit some degree of
violation of what is ideally the case. Formally it is an extension of standard
deontic logic (SDL), which is a normal KD system according to Chellas’ (1981)
classification, and which incorporates, besides the normal deontic operators Oi
and Pi, the deontic operators Os and Ps. Oi and Pi retain their usual reading.
OiA (PiA), at a world w, mean: A holds in all (some) of w’s deontically ideal
versions. OsA (PsA), at a world w, mean: A holds in all (some) of w’s sub-ideal
versions. DL allows us to define the following notions:
– NDA =df (O
iA ∧ OsA) (Deontic Necessity)
– OTA =df (O
iA ∧ Ps¬A) (Ought)
Since DL is a straightforward extension of SDL both Oi, Pi and Os, Ps behave
as normal KD-modalities. Models for DL are thus structures:
M = 〈W, Ri, Rs, υ〉
where Ri, Rs ⊆ W × W are serial (not reflexive) relations on W (intuitive
reading: wRiv = v is an ideal version of w, wRsv = v is a sub-ideal version of
w), subject to the following conditions:
C1: Ri ∩ Rs = ∅
C2: {〈w, w〉 : w ∈ W} ⊆ Ri ∪Rs
that is to say that there cannot exist ideal worlds that are also sub-ideal, and
every world is either ideal or sub-ideal relative to itself (notice that this intro-
duces some form of reflexivity in the model); υ is as usual with the following
clauses for Oi and Os respectively
|=w O
iA ⇔ ∀v ∈ W : wRiv, |=v A
|=w O
sA ⇔ ∀v ∈ W : wRsv, |=v A
Remark 1. Condition C2 has been dropped in (Jones 1991), so that possible
worlds can be both ideal and subideal with respect to themselves; however,
when condition C2 may be parametrized with respect to content matters, see
(Epstein 1990), and this may lead to a more satisfactory solution; in fact a section
of the “Italian code of criminal procedure” concerns the connected crimes: in a
criminal trial pieces of evidence from other trials are examined if and only if
they are judged to be relevant (connected) to the subject of the trial; a parking
fine, will not usually be considered relevant in an adjudication for murder.
3 The System KEM
In this section we shall present KEM in its barest outline. We first recall some
basic notions. We shall use the letters X, Y, Z, . . . to denote arbitrary signed
formulas (S-formulas), i.e. formulas of the forms SA where S ∈ {T, F}. As usual
XC will be used to denote the conjugate of X , i.e. the result of changing S to
its opposite (with the exception of the following S-formulas1: T2A, F3A, F2A
and F3A which also have T3¬A, F2¬A, F3¬A, T2¬A respectively as their
conjugates). Two S-formulas X, Z such that Z = XC , will be called complemen-
tary. As we have already said, KEM approach requires us to work with “world”
labels. A “world” label is either a constant or a variable “world” symbol or a
“structured” sequence of world-symbols we call a “world-path”. Intuitively, con-
stant and variable world-symbols stand for worlds and sets of worlds respectively,
while a world-path conveys information about access between the worlds in it.
We attach labels to S-formulas to yield labelled signed formulas (LS-formulas),
i.e. pairs of the form X, i where X is an S-formula and i is a label. An LS-
formula SA, i means, intuitively, that A is true (false) at the (last) world (on the
path represented by) i. In the course of proof search, labels are manipulated in
a way closely related to the semantics of modal operators and “matched” using
a (specialized, logic-dependent) unification algorithm. That two world-paths i
and k are unifiable means, intuitively, that they virtually represent the same
path, i.e. any world which you could arrive at by path i could be reached by
path k and vice versa. LS-formulas whose labels are unifiable turn out to be true
(false) at the same world(s) relative to the accessibility relation that holds in the
appropriate class of models. In particular two LS-formulas X, XC whose labels
are unifiable stand for formulas which are contradictory “in the same world”.
These ideas are formalized as follows.
1 Herein with 2 we mean any modality which acts as 2, i.e. Oi and Os; and with 3
any modality which acts as 3, i.e. Pi and Ps.
3.1 Label Formalism
To treat DL we need three kinds of label world symbols
– Universal ΦW = {W1, W2, · · · } and Φw = {w1, w2, · · · }
– Ideal ΦD = {D1, D2, · · · } and Φd = {d1, d2, · · · }
– Subideal ΦS = {S1, S2, · · · } and Φs = {s1, s2, · · · }
Here the universal world labels denote worlds for which we do not have enough
information to specify whether they are ideal or subideal. Let us now define the
set of variable world symbols and constant world symbols respectively:
ΦV = ΦW ∪ ΦD ∪ ΦS and
ΦC = Φw ∪ Φd ∪ Φs.
On this basis the set = is now defined as
= =
⋃
1≤i
=i where =i is :
=1 = ΦC ∪ ΦV ;
=2 = =1 × ΦC ;
=n+1 = =1 ×=n.
In other words a world-label is either (i) an element of the set ΦC , or (ii) an
element of the set ΦV , or (iii) a path term (k
′, k) where (iiia) k′ ∈ ΦC ∪ ΦV and
(iiib) k ∈ ΦC or k = (m′, m) where (m′, m) is a label. It is worth noting that
such a representation of labels captures the precise meaning of the accessibility
relation; in fact, the label (w2, (W1, w1)) denotes a path which leads to a world
(w2) accessible from all the worlds accessible from the world denoted by w1.
If labels were sequences of constants and variables, their reading is ambiguous:
i.e. what does a label such as 〈W1, w2, w1〉 stand for? Does it mean that w1
sees all the worlds accessible from w2, or does it have the same meaning as
(W1, (w2, w1))? The two possible readings of a labels written as a sequence, give
rise to different accessibility relations.
A bit of terminology. For any label i = (k′, k) we call k′ the head of i,
k the body of i, and denote them by h(i) and b(i) respectively. Notice that
these notions are recursive: if b(i) denotes the body of i, then b(b(i)) will de-
note the body of b(i), b(b(b(i))) will denote the body of b(b(i)); and so on.
For example, if i is (w4, (W3, (w3, (W2, w1)))), then b(i) = (W3, (w3, (W2, w1))),
b(b(i)) = (w3, (W2, w1)), b(b(b(i))) = (W2, w1), b(b(b(b(i)))) = w1. We call each
of b(i),b(b(i)), etc., a segment of i. Let s(i) denote any segment of i (obviously,
by definition every segment s(i) of a label i is a label); then h(s(i)) will denote
the head of s(i).
For any label i, we define the length of i, l(i), as the number of world-symbols
in i, i.e. l(i) = n ⇔ i ∈ =n.
We shall use sn(i) to denote the segment of i whose length is n
3.2 Unification Schemes
KEM ’s label unification scheme involves two kinds of unifications, respectively
“high” and “low”. “High” unifications are meant to mirror specific accessibility
constraints and they are used to build “low” unifications, which account for
the full range of conditions governing the appropriate accessibility relation. We
then begin by defining the basic notion of “high” unification. First we define a
substitution in the usual way as a function
σ : Φ0V −→ =
−
: ΦiV −→ =
i, (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
where =− = = − ΦV . For two labels i, k and a substitution σ, if σ is a unifier
of i and k then we shall say that i and k are σ-unifiable. We shall (somewhat
unconventionally) use (i, k)σ to denote both that i and k are σ-unifiable and the
result of their unification.
(i, k)σ =
{
σi = σk l(i) = l(k) = 1
((h(i), h(k))σ, (b(i), b(k))σ)
In order to get the appropriate unifications we need to define the following
substitution acting as σ for universal world symbols:
σ#ΦW = σΦW
and as follows for ideal an sub-ideal world symbols:
σ# : ΦS → Φ
s
: ΦD → Φ
d
where
Φd = {ir ∈ ΦC : r = d} Φ
s = {ir ∈ ΦC : r = s}
Φd, Φs denote the set of worlds that are respectively an ideal and a subideal
version of themselves.
According to the above substitutions we define the
(i, k)σW = (t× (b(s(i)), b(k))σJ ) ⇐⇒
l(k) > 1, ∃s(i) : ∀s′(i)(l(s′(i)) > l(s(i)),
(h(s′(i)), h(k))σ# = (h(s(i)), h(k))σ = t) and
(b(s(i)), b(k))σJ or
(i, k)σW = t, if l(k) = 1
or
(i, k)σW = (t× (b(i), b(s(k)))σJ ) ⇐⇒
l(i) > 1, ∃s(k) : ∀s′(k)(l(s′(k)) > l(s(k)),
(h(i), h(s′(k)))σ# = (h(i), h(s(k)))σ = t) and
(b(i), b(s(k)))σJ or
(i, k)σW = t, if l(i) = 1
where
(i, k)σJ = (i, k)σ or (i, k)σW .
For example the labels (D1, (w
i
2, w1)) and (w
i
2, w1) σ
W -unify since t = wi2 =
(D1, w
i
2)σ
# = (wi2, w
i
2)σ and obviously (w1, w1)σ
J . A more complex example is
given by the labels (wi2, (W1, (D1, (S1, w
s
1)))) and (D2, w
s
1) where ((S1, w
s
1), w
s
1)σ
J
and t = wi2 = (D2, w
i
2)σ
# = (D2, W1)σ
# = (D2, D1)σ.
We are now able to characterize DL by the notion of σDL-unification:
(i, k)σDL =
{
(i, k)σ
(i, k)σW
3.3 Labels, Unifications and Legal Reasoning
What does a possible world denote? We suggest that a possible and plausible
answer could be that a possible world of a given type represents an actual fact,
and another type of possible world denotes laws. The unifications tell us when
two labels are “matchable”. If they are, we can compare whatever holds in the
worlds they denote; therefore we can decide, analytically, whether a given fact
is a violation of a law.
Obviously, according to our philosophical point of view, the formalization
of norms will behave in different ways. We believe that our label manipulation
could help to examine a few ideas about norms. Let us examine the basic cases
of unifications
Case 1. A variable and a constant;
Case 2. Two constants;
Case 3. Two variables.
Roughly, cases 1, 2 and 3 correspond respectively to:
– Distribution axiom 2(A → B) → (2A → 2B);
– Necessitation rule
A
2A
;
– Kant’s axiom 2A → 3A.
Combining cases 1, 2 and 3 we can obtain different philosophical positions con-
cerning norms.
Case 1 implies that norms express generic “situations” and we have to detect
whether a given “situation” falls into the category of the generic one.
Case 2 implies that each norm expresses a given situation and we have to
detect whether a given situation is the same as that of the norm, so each situation
should have its specific norm.
Case 3 (idealization) implies the completeness of a normative system in a
weak sense. So each instance of a situation should be determined by the norms. If
there is a gap in a normative system, this condition states that norms themselves
should give tools to fill the gap.
Almost every positive legal system has some mechanism to fulfil the require-
ment of the last case. For example, in Italian Law, article 12, 2◦ comma of the
“Preleggi” prescribes analogical reasoning.
3.4 Inference Rules
We shall classify our inference rules in two main categories: structural rules and
operational rules; the operational rules describe the meaning of the various op-
erators and connectives involved (see (D’Agostino Mondadori 1994) for further
explanations), whereas structural rules describe semantic properties holding in
the model for the logic we are concerned with. Moreover it is possible to have
other non-standard connectives and operators for which we can state their ap-
propriate inference rules using labels, see (D’Agostino Gabbay 1994). The rules
for the connectives are stated as follows2:
α, j
α1, j
α, j
α2, j
β, j
βC2 , k
β1, (j, k)σDL
(j, k)σDL
β, j
βC1 , k
β2, (j, k)σDL
(j, k)σDL
For the modal-like operators we have
TNDA, j
TA, (Wn, j)
ν{i,s}A, j
ν0, ({D, S}n, j)
{D, S}n new
and
FNDA, i
FOiA ∧ OsA, i
pi{i,s}, i
pi0, ({d, s}n, i)
{d, s}n new
The “standard” structural inference rules, respectively the principle of bivalence
(PB) and the principle of not contradiction (PNC), are:
X, j XC , j
h(j) ∈ ΦC
X, j
XC , k
×(j, k)σDL
(j, k)σDL
Here the α-rules are just the familiar linear branch-expansion rules of the tableau
method, while the β-rules correspond to such common natural inference patterns
as modus ponens, modus tollens, etc. (i, k, m stand for arbitrary labels). The rules
for the modal operators are as usual. “new” in the proviso for the ν{i,s}- and
pi{i,s}-rule means: {D, S}n, {d, s}n must not have occurred in any label yet used.
Notice that in all inferences via an α-rule the label of the premise carries over
unchanged to the conclusion, and in all inferences via a β-rule the labels of the
premises must be σDL-unifiable, so that the conclusion inherits their unification.
2 The following formulation uses a generalized α, β, ν{i,s}, pi{i,s} form of Smullyan-
Fitting α, β, ν, pi unifying notation, see (Fitting 1983).
PB (the “Principle of Bivalence”) represents the (LS-version of the) semantic
counterpart of the cut rule of the sequent calculus (intuitive meaning: a formula
A is either true or false in any given world, whence the requirement that i
should be restricted). PNC (the “Principle of Non-Contradiction”) corresponds
to the familiar branch-closure rule of the tableau method, saying that from the
occurrence of a pair of LS-formulas X, i, XC , k such that (i, k)σDL (let us call
them σDL-complementary) on a branch we may infer the closure (“×”) of the
branch. The (i, k)σDL in the “conclusion” of PNC means that the contradiction
holds “in the same world”.
The peculiar structural inference rules of DL, the rules which represent the
conditions of the model, are:
X, (D, j)
X, (S, k)
X, (Wn, (j, k)σDL)
(j, k)σDL
which states that a property holds universally. The main purpose of this rule is
to ensure reflexivity with respect to j and k, i.e, each world is either an ideal or
a subideal version of itself; in fact a general property of labels and unifications
states that
(j, k)σDL ⇒ ((j, k)σDL, j)σDL and ((j, k)σDL, k)σDL .
The next rule, RR (Reflexivity Rule) tells us when a world is an ideal or subideal
version of itself.
ν{i,s}, j
νC0 , k
ν{i,s}, m
r m = (j, k)σDL
νC0 , m
r
where
ir = is if ν{i,s} = TO
iA (FPiA)
ir = id if ν{i,s} = TO
sA (FPsA)
and
ix = i : h(i) ∈ Φx, (x ∈ {d, s})
Obviously each ΦrX ⊆ ΦX . We shall call labels of the form i
x, (x ∈ {d, s})
x-reflexive labels.
Besides the usual closure rule (PNC) and the principle of bivalence (PB)
we introduce the following rules LPNC and LPB
j ∈ Φs
j ∈ Φd
× X, ji K, js
stating, respectively, that no world can be at the same time an ideal and a
subideal version of itself and that each worlds is either an ideal or a subideal
version of itself.
3.5 Proof search
Let Γ = {X1, . . . , Xm} be a set of S-formulas. Then T is a KEM-tree for Γ if
there exists a finite sequence (T1, T2, . . . , Tn) such that (i) T1 is a 1-branch tree
consisting of {X1, i . . . , Xm, i}, where i is an arbitrary constant label; (ii) Tn = T ,
and (iii) for each i < n, Ti+1 results from Ti by an application of a rule of KEM .
A branch τ of a KEM -tree T of LS-formulas is said to be σDL-closed if it ends
with an application of PNC, open otherwise. As usual with tableau methods, a
set Γ of formulas is checked for consistency by constructing a KEM -tree for Γ .
It is worth noting that each KEM -tree is a (class of) Hintikka’s model(s) where
the labels denote worlds (i.e. Hintikka’s modal sets), and the unifications behave
according to the conditions placed on the appropriate accessibility relations.
Moreover we say that a formula A is a KEM-consequence of a set of formulas Γ
if A occurs in all the open branches of a KEM -tree for Γ . We now describe a
systematic procedure for KEM . First we define the following notions.
Given a branch τ of a KEM -tree, we shall call an LS-formula X, i E-analysed
in τ if either (i) X is of type α and both α1, i and α2, i occur in τ ; or (ii) X
is of type β and one of the following conditions is satisfied: (a) if βC1 , k occurs
in τ and (i, k)σDL, then also β2, (i, k)σDL occurs in τ , (b) if β
C
2 , k occurs in τ
and (i, k)σDL, then also β1, (i, k)σDL occurs in τ ; or (iii) X is of type νi and
ν0, (m, i) occurs in τ for some m ∈ ΦV not previously occurring in τ , or (iv) X
is of type pii and pi0, (m, i) occurs in τ for some m ∈ ΦC not previously occurring
in τ .
We shall call a branch τ of a KEM -tree E-completed if every LS-formula
in it is E-analysed and it contains no complementary formulas which are not
σDL-complementary. We shall say a branch τ of a KEM -tree completed if it
is E-completed and all the LS-formulas of type β in it either are analysed or
cannot be analysed. We shall call a KEM -tree completed if every branch is
completed.
The following procedure starts from the 1-branch, 1-node tree consisting of
{X1, i1, . . . , Xm, im} and applies the rules of KEM until the resulting KEM -
tree is either closed or completed.
We shall say that a formula A is a theorem of DL when a closed KEM -tree
for FA, w1 exists.
At each stage of proof search (i) we choose an open non completed branch τ .
If τ is not E-completed, then (ii) we apply the 1-premise rules until τ becomes
E-completed. If the resulting branch τ ′ is neither closed nor completed, then
(iii) we apply the 2-premise rules until τ becomes E-completed. If the resulting
branch τ ′ is neither closed nor completed, then (iv) we choose an LS-formula of
type β which is not yet analysed in the branch and apply PB so that the resulting
LS-formulas are β1, i
′ and βC1 , i
′ (or, equivalently β2, i
′ and βC2 , i
′), where i = i′ if
i is restricted, otherwise i′ is obtained from i by instantiating h(i) to a constant
not occurring in i; (v) (“Modal PB”) if the branch is not E-completed nor
closed, because of complementary formulas which are not σDL-complementary,
then we have to see whether a restricted label unifying with both the labels of the
complementary formulas occurs previously in the branch; if such a label exists,
or can be built using already existing labels and the unification rules, then the
branch is closed; (vi) (“Label PB”) if the branch is not E-completed nor closed,
because of complementary formulas which are not σDL-complementary and the
heads of their labels, j, k, are respectively in ΦD and ΦS , then we have to see
whether there exists a restricted non reflexive label, that, when it is i-reflexive,
unifies with j and when it is s-reflexive unifies with k; if such a label exists, or
can be built using already existing labels and unification rules, then the branch
is closed; (vii) we repeat the procedure in each branch generated by PB.
The above procedure is based on a (deterministic) procedure working for
canonical KEM -trees. A KEM -tree is said to be canonical if it is generated
by applying the rules of KEM in the following fixed order: first the α-, ν{d,s}-
and pi{d,s}-rule, then the β-rule and PNC, and finally PB. Two interesting
properties of canonical KEM -trees are (i) that a canonical KEM -tree always
terminates, since for each formula there are a finite number of subformulas and
the number of labels which can occur in the KEM -tree for a formula A (of L) is
limited by the number of modal operators belonging to A, and (ii) that for each
closed KEM -tree a closed canonical KEM -tree exists. Proofs of termination
and completeness for canonical KEDL-trees follow by obvious modifications of
the proofs given in (Governatori 1995).
Remark 2. We distinguish between DL-theories, obtained by means of configu-
rations of possible worlds, and DL obtained by means of the above inference rules
and unifications. It is worth noting that labels allow us not only to manipulate
formulas in deductions but also worlds, which turns out to be very important
when dealing with theories. For a similar approach see (Russo 1996).
The following are example proofs of theorems of DL.
1. F (OsA ∧ ¬A) → Ps¬A w1
2. TOsA ∧ ¬A w1
3. FPs¬A w1
4. TOsA w1
5. FA w1
6. TOsA ws1
7. FA ws1
8. TA S1, w
s
1
9. ×
The steps leading to the nodes (1)-(5) are straightforward. The nodes (6)-(7)
come from the application of the reflexivity rule since the world denoted by w1
is a sub-ideal version of itself. Closure follows immediately from (7) and (8),
which are σDL-complementary (their labels σDL-unify because of (S1, w
s
1)σ
#).
1. FOiA → (OsB → (¬A → B)) w1
2. TOiA w1
3. FOsB → (¬A → B) w1
4. TOsB w1
5. F¬A → B w1
6. FA w1
7. FB w1
8. ws1
9. wi1
10. ×
Here the steps (8) and (9) are obtained, respectively, from (2), (6) and (4), (7)by
RR and the closure follows from an application of LPNC.
1. F (Oi(A ∧ B) ∧Os(C ∧D)) → (A ∨ C) w1
2. TOi(A ∧ B) ∧ Os(C ∧D) w1
3. FA ∨ C w1
4. TOi(A ∧ B) w1
5. TOs(C ∧D) w1
6. FA w1
7. FC w1
8. TA ∧ B D1, w1
9. TC ∧D S1.w1
10. TA D1, w1
11. TB D1, w1
12. TC S1.w1
13. TD S1.w1
14. T wi1
16.×
15. F ws1
17.×
In the left branch, closure follows from TA, (D1, w1), FA, w1 and w
i
1, after we
have assumed, through the label version of PB, that w1 is an ideal version of
itself, i.e., wi1, we replace, with respect to the left branch, all the occurrences of
w1 with w
i
1 thus obtaining D1, w
i
1 and w
i
1 which σDL-unify; on the other hand,
in the right branch we have TC, (S1, w1), FC, w1 and w
s
1, and we can repeat the
same procedure as for the left side.
4 Final Remarks
Although a satisfactory Logical System for Law is far from being realized, we
believe that the approach we have presented may offer a few steps in the right
direction. In fact, the label tool we have developed is flexible enough to cope
with several types of modal-like notions of obligatoriness at the same time, and
to study their mutual relationships through unifications. It often happens that,
in a legal system, laws prescribe opposite possibilities for the same fact according
to “relevant” pieces of evidence; for example, some legal system could prescribe a
murder to be punished unless he/she killed in self-defence. Logically this scenario
is contradictory because, in the case of self-defence, both punishment and not
punishment are implied; however it is possible to solve this problem as soon
as some refinement is assumed; on this point see (Artosi Governatori Sartor
1996). Moreover, as we have already seen, different traits of legal reasoning might
involve different kinds of logics (even with different connectives and operators);
the resulting overall logic can be embedded in the so called fibred semantics
(logic) framework (Gabbay 1994), but the label formalism here presented can be
extended, straightforwardly, to deal with it.
The preceding discussion was thus mainly aimed at showing the potential
scope of application of the method. In effect, we believe that the method we
proposed to determine the ideal/subideal status of world nicely exploits the
computational and proof-theoretical advantages offered by the modal theorem
proving system KEM . As we have argued elsewhere, this system enjoys most
of the features a suitable proof search system for modal (and in general non-
classical) logics should have. In contrast with (both clausal and non-clausal)
resolution methods, and in general “translation-based” methods (Ohlbach 1991),
it works for the full modal language (thus avoiding any preprocessing of the input
formulas), and it is flexible enough to be extended to cover any setting having a
Kripke-model based semantics (this is clearly shown by our treatment of Jones
and Po¨rn logic DL where the rules specific for such a logic should take care
not only of the propositional and modal part but also of the structure of the
labels and the relationship between labels and formulas; for example we added
another closure rule i∈Φ
i,i∈Φs
× which states that no world can be at the same time
an ideal and a sub-ideal version of itself; this result is achieved by determining
when a deontic word is ideally (sub-ideally) reflexive (ir) by means of another
peculiar inference rule, and finally the principle of bivalence for labels). From
this perspective our method is similar to the natural deduction proof method
proposed by Russo (1996). Nevertheless, it has several advantages over most
tableau/sequent based theorem proving methods: being based on D’Agostino and
Mondadori’s classical proof system KE, it eliminates the typical redundancy of
the standard cut-free methods and, thanks to its label unification scheme, it offers
a simple and efficient solution to the permutation problem which notoriously
arises at the level of the usual tableau-sequent rules for the modal operators
(Fitting 1988). However, unlike e.g. Wallen’s (1990) connection method, it uses
a natural and easily implementable style of proof construction, and so it appears
to provide an adequate basis for combining both efficiency and naturalness.
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